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Leidschrift, jaargang 27, nummer 2, september 2012 
On July 22, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson lay wide awake. He was 
contemplating next month’s Democratic National Convention (DNC) in 
Atlantic City, where delegations from all fifty states would nominate him as 
their candidate for the upcoming presidential elections. He wanted it to be a 
triumphant event. But a group of poor, illiterate, disenfranchised black 
Mississippians threatened this: they had gotten the wild idea of asking to be 
seated instead of the official, all-white Mississippi delegation, which was 
elected through the illegitimate exclusion of the state’s black population. In 
doing so this group, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), 
effectively asked the national Democratic Party to renege its decades-long 
cautious approach towards civil rights. Rejecting the ‘Dixiecrats’, the 
powerful pro-segregationist Southern wing within the Party, however, could 
cost Johnson the presidency. But indulging them was also dangerous 
because it would lose him vital Northern support. ‘The only thing that can 
really screw us good,’ the President realized, is ‘that group of challengers 
from Mississippi.’1                
 How did a politically inexperienced, uneducated bunch of black 
‘country bumpkins’, as MFDP-delegate Aaron Henry called themselves, 
manage to corner the most important man in the nation and thereby change 
electoral politics forever? The story of the MFDP helps to explain how 
social change comes about and the role that pressure groups can play in it. 
In civil rights movement historiography, social change has generally been 
treated as a top-down product of legislative breakthroughs accomplished 
through professional civil rights organizations and national leaders like 
Martin Luther King. More recent scholars, however, downplay the role of 
the latter. By playing up the importance of ‘local people’, they see social 
change predominantly as a bottom-up process of nationwide grassroots 
activism. As an organization spearheaded by grassroots leadership but 
facilitated by fulltime organizers, the MFDP accordingly complicates such 
explanations on the production of social change. Moreover, the MFDP’s 
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refusal to let the DNC – or Martin Luther King – dictate the way in which 
social change was realized by rejecting its offer of two seats demonstrates 
that it is possible for protest groups to play at the highest national level 
without sacrificing their grassroots character. Or, as MFDP-delegate Fannie 
Lou Hamer remarked, ‘We didn’t come all this way for no two seats when 
all of us is tired!’2   
    
 
Opening the Closed Society 
 
The MFDP’s foundation reflected Mississippi’s abysmal civil rights record. 
Whereas other Southern state Democratic Parties at least had token black 
representation and claimed some kinship with its national organ, black 
participation in Mississippi politics was the lowest nationwide. Although 
blacks comprised 45% of the population, less than 5% were registered to 
vote due to whites’ widespread use of intimidation and trickery. To qualify 
to vote one had to answer 21 questions, including interpreting any of the 
state Constitution’s 285 sections. The white registrar chose which section 
and evaluated the interpretation. Not surprisingly, illiterate whites regularly 
passed while blacks, no matter how educated, nearly always failed. State law 
also required the printing of registrants’ names in local newspapers. This 
made them easy targets for terrorist groups like the Ku Klux Klan, but also 
for landlords or employers to respectively evict or fire them. Critics were 
forced to leave the state or were even murdered.3 
                                                     
2 Archives Roosevelt Study Center, Archives Lyndon B. Johnson Papers (hereafter: 
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 White rule in Mississippi was so oppressive – local history professor 
James Silver famously called the state a ‘closed society’ – that civil rights 
efforts had made little headway. Under the direction of black organizer 
Robert Parris Moses, the civil rights organization SNCC (Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) renewed voter registration drives in 
1961 on the premise that ordinary citizens, no matter how poor or 
uneducated, were capable of instigating change. When SNCC’s efforts met 
vicious resistance, national and local civil rights groups united in one 
statewide umbrella organization called COFO (Council of Federated 
Organizations). After three more years of hardship, COFO realized that the 
only way to better Mississippi blacks’ situation was reaching a national 
audience, which subsequently could induce the federal government to 
institute stronger civil rights legislation. With nearly one thousand white 
Northern volunteers, COFO therefore organized ‘Freedom Summer’, a 
massive, statewide program of civil rights activities. Local whites felt so 
threatened by this ‘invasion’ that they fortified their opposition. The FBI 
documented that COFO suffered 1,000 arrests, 35 shootings, and eight 
beatings throughout the summer; COFO reported many more. Aided by 
local policemen the White Knights, a division of the Ku Klux Klan, brutally 
murdered COFO-workers James Chaney and Michael Schwerner, and 
volunteer Andrew Goodman. Because Schwerner and Goodman were 
white, the murders dominated national and even world headlines for two 
months. This put additional pressure on President Johnson and the 
Democratic Party to do something about civil rights.4   
 Because 1964 was an election year, COFO reasoned that mounting a 
political challenge as part of the Freedom Summer program would be its 
best chance of gaining the federal government’s attention. Or, as Moses 
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later reflected, it was ‘our one chance of attacking the state where they were 
the weakest, and their weakest point politically was at the [DNC].’ They 
therefore founded the MFDP on April 26. The idea of the MFDP was as 
simple as it was genius. The regular state Democratic Party, which ruled the 
state dictatorially, held precinct, county, district, and state elections 
throughout the summer to choose its delegates for the DNC. Mississippi 
blacks attempted to vote in these elections, but if excluded, Party bylaws 
allowed them to duplicate the regular Party’s machinery and hold their own 
elections to choose DNC delegates. Because their elections would be open 
to everyone of voting age regardless of race, literacy level, or other 
qualifications, they could then go to the DNC and claim that their delegates 
truly represented the state’s population, and thus that the seats of the 
Mississippi section (and the voting power that came along with them) 
legitimately belonged to them. Apart from demanding a chance to be 
included in the state and national democratic process, the MFDP wanted to 
use their gathered evidence of exclusion by the regular Mississippi 
Democrats to strengthen the movement’s demands for stronger voter 
legislation, induce federal lawsuits to nullify state election results, and curtail 
racial harassment. The MFDP’s seating challenge was thus a one-time, 
nationally-oriented enterprise, but the party itself was founded as a lasting 
instrument for grassroots empowerment. It was designed, its organizers 
documented, to be a racially integrated, statewide ‘people’s organization’ 
whose leadership was derived from ‘the people’ and was ‘responsible at all 
times for all its decision[s] to its people.’5 
 Moses and other COFO-workers gathered financial and political 
support for Freedom Summer and the MFDP from the five largest national 
civil rights organizations (SNCC, Roy Wilkins’ NAACP, Martin Luther 
King’s SCLC, James Farmer’s CORE and Whitney Young’s Urban League). 
They also gained the backing of Bayard Rustin, a brilliant black organizer 
with a mass of experience – he was a mentor to Martin Luther King and 
helped organize the March on Washington – and that of Allard Lowenstein, 
a charismatic white activist with strong ties to northern white students. 
Even more impressive was the support they secured from Democratic Party 
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heavyweights such as Joseph Rauh, who worked as a lawyer for Walter 
Reuther’s United Auto Workers (UAW), then the most powerful union in 
America. Rauh also belonged to the Credentials Committee, the body that 
would be deciding the Challenge’s outcome. Rauh’s presence during these 
preliminary stages proved vital. ‘Without [his] technical guidance,’ Henry 
acknowledged, ‘we probably would have been completely overwhelmed.’ 
The MFDP also opened an office under black organizer Ella Baker’s 
direction in Washington. She discussed plans with A. Philip Randolph, 
Adam Clayton Powell, and other labor, civil rights, and political leaders. 
Office workers lobbied delegates nationwide to get their states to pass 
resolutions supporting the MFDP. Subsequently, MFDP-historian Vanessa 
Davis wrote, ‘the Johnson administration (…) began to take the challenge 
seriously.’6 
The MFDP’s national strategy alongside its grassroots approach 
accordingly complicates explanations on the production of social change. 
Henry for instance stated that if one believed that the MFDP could just be 
‘let in’ at Atlantic City ‘you ain’t with it. It took Whitney Young, Roy 
Wilkins[,] Martin Luther King [and] the power of this nation to open that 
door.’ Simultaneously he validated grassroots leadership by denying that 
outsiders brought the idea ‘to Mississippi (…) What they found was a 
discussion of it when they got here [so] let nobody ever feel that the 
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[MFDP] was an idea imposed upon us – it was us!’ Moreover, the efforts of 
(black) Mississippians themselves prompted any outsider’s involvement, 
because they literally risked their lives for its realization. Attending the 
regular Party elections was so dangerous that locals in several counties 
refused altogether. In most only a handful tried, although generally futile: 
despite state law three-quarters of Mississippi’s 1,884 precincts held no 
elections (or whites lied about time and location), in six blacks were 
excluded, and in the rest generally barred from voting. The few blacks who 
were admitted to the Regulars’ county conventions were similarly excluded 
there. None were elected to their state convention.7 
The MFDP now proceeded with its own elections, but only 40 out 
of Mississippi’s 82 counties held them due to white harassment including 
(false) arrests, beatings, and burnings of meeting places. Elections that were 
held meticulously followed Party rules, but, inspired by SNCC’s ideal of 
grassroots democracy, discussions lasted until everyone understood the 
issues to be voted on. The MFDP was an unprecedented experiment in 
bottom-up leadership in another aspect too. Its composition reflected class 
conditions in the black community: barely a fifth of its members consisted 
of the traditional middle-class leadership of ministers, teachers, or 
businessmen; the rest represented the vast majority of sharecroppers, maids, 
farmers, and other blue-collar workers. Since decision-making was based 
upon SNCC’s example of consensus – which itself owed much to the 
Quaker model – sharecroppers had the same powers as the professionals. 
MFDP-meetings accordingly represented ‘a politics unmatched anywhere 
else in the United States.’ Despite participants’ inexperience, one observer 
reported, ‘[w]ithin minutes they (…) had elected a chairman, secretary, [and] 
delegates (…) [It was] indicative of the innate political nature of all men.’8  
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Meetings were not successful everywhere, however. Especially in 
rural areas only few showed up. Integrating meetings to demonstrate the 
MFDP was an open party was even trickier to realize, because canvassing in 
white areas meant risking to get shot. Some had difficulty grasping 
proceedings or the MFDP’s significance. ‘One man,’ one witness 
commented, ‘said flatly that he didn’t understand what the purpose of the 
meeting was.’ Fulltime COFO-workers countered such impediments by 
addressing meetings themselves and distributing memoranda citing the 
chair’s and other officials’ responsibilities and instructions on how to 
formulate resolutions and conduct nominations.9 
During their August 6 state convention 800 MFDP-representatives 
elected a 64-headed delegation to the DNC. Black pharmacist Aaron Henry 
and black sharecropper Fannie Lou Hamer were elected chair and vice chair 
of the DNC delegation, and black SNCC-worker Lawrence Guyot overall 
party chairman. Their platform pledged loyalty to the national Party – in 
contrast to the regular delegation which, disgusted by the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act’s passage, threatened to oppose President Johnson’s in the November 
elections. ‘Man, this is the stuff democracy is made of’, one observer 
recorded excited, ‘it was a demonstration that the people of Mississippi 
want to be let into America.’ Rauh outlined the ‘11 and 8’-strategy the 
MFDP would follow in Atlantic City: First they would present their case to 
the Credentials Committee. If it refused them, they could request a roll-call  
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Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’, no date, Files #0114-0115, ‘What To Do 
At A FDP Precinct Meeting’ and ‘What To Do At A FDP County Convention’, no 
date, File #0276, ‘Convention Challenge’, File #1293, ‘Mississippi Freedom 
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Fig. 1: Pamphlet explaining the MFDP in simplistic terms (Source: 
http://www.educationanddemocracy.org) 
 
– if supported by eleven of the Committee’s 108 members and eight state 
delegations – which meant that all fifty state delegations were forced to vote 
on the issue. Several already pledged support. Subsequently most 
participants, Moses recalled, began to believe that ‘the [national] party 
would embrace them.’10  
                                                     
10 Davis, ‘Sisters and Brothers All’, 88-89; SCRBC, Iris Greenberg Freedom Summer 
Collection, Documents ‘Platform and Principles MFDP’ and ‘Loyalty Resolution’, 
no dates; King, Freedom Song, 341; Hogan, Many Minds, One Heart, 181; Dittmer, 
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State and national politicians’ reactions demonstrated that they instantly 
recognized the MFDP as powerful despite its inexperience. The regular 
Mississippi Democrats11 vigorously crossed its efforts, which paradoxically 
strengthened the MFDP’s case. Guyot was falsely arrested12 and Secretary 
of State Herbert Heber refused to register the MFDP. The State Attorney 
General filed injunctions prohibiting it from using the name of Freedom 
Democratic Party and MFDP-leaders from acting as its representatives. At 
their state convention the Regulars adopted Governor Paul Johnson’s plea 
to ‘refrain from taking any position regarding support of presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates’ until the DNC rejected the MFDP. Most 
Regulars openly supported the President’s conservative Republican 
opponent, Barry Goldwater. 13  The governors of Alabama, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Florida likewise threatened to boycott the DNC if it seated 
the MFDP.14  
Meanwhile nine northern states (California, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, New York, and Washington) 
                                                                                                                      
Papers, Interview Anne Romaine with Joseph Rauh, June 16, 1967; Archive 
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he was deliberately detained until the DNC was over so Guyot could not exercise 
any influence in Atlantic City. 
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‘Sisters and Brothers All’, 109. 
14 Davis, ‘Sisters and Brothers All’, 89-90, 93-94; SCRBC, Iris Greenberg Freedom 
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and the District of Columbia ardently supported the MFDP. Their reasons, 
however, varied. The Michigan and New York delegations, for instance, 
emphasized that the DNC ‘should consist only of delegates devoted to the 
principles and objectives of the Party’, whereas the Minnesota and 
Wisconsin delegations stressed the ‘opportunity (…) to demonstrate [the 
Party’s] devotion to justice and equal rights.’ Yet memoranda from the 
DNC’s general counsel, Harold Leventhal, show that overall the Party was 
more concerned with the Regulars’ disloyalty than with discrimination, 
because, he asked, ‘what Southern delegation isn’t truly subject to the same 
charge?’15 
 The MFDP nonetheless directly influenced the Democratic Party’s 
leadership. For example, the administration was preoccupied with the 
MFDP well before August. In July Leventhal wrote Credentials Committee 
chair David Lawrence to offer the MFDP ‘fine spectator seats’ as honored 
guests. As the MFDP’s support grew, however, he realized the Party was in 
a regular Catch-22 that made a full rejection impossible: ‘The contestants –
while weak on their own credentials – make a case against the Regular 
Democrats that will seem strong and just in many quarters.’ He therefore 
advocated an ‘intermediate solution’ like ‘splitting the delegation on a lop-
sided basis’ and a promise of future reform. But President Johnson had 
meanwhile decided not to seat the MFDP because he feared the southern 
walk-out. He promised Hubert Humphrey the vice-presidency if he could 
prevent it and pressured moderate civil rights allies like NAACP-director 
Roy Wilkins and UAW-president Walter Reuther to help him. He also 
ordered the FBI to infiltrate MFDP-meetings and wiretap King, Rustin, 
SNCC, and the MFDP. He even contemplated renouncing his nomination, 
because he did not ‘want to have to fight to carry Texas’, his pro-
segregationist home state. Although it is doubtful whether he was serious, 
the MFDP had evidently penetrated his conscience – to the extent of 
obsession. Simultaneously he also sympathized with its cause. As he 
privately stated in August: the Regulars ‘oughtn’t to be seated. [They] 
wouldn’t let those nigras vote. And that’s not right.’ The MFDP’s effect on 
politics was thus immediate and long-term: it helped officials like Johnson in 
their determination to do something about civil rights – even if it had to 
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wait until after the presidential elections due to ‘politics’. As he told Reuther 
on August 9, ‘If they give us four years, I’ll guarantee the [MFDP] (…) will 
be seated four years from now.’ On August 25 he repeated this 
commitment: ‘We’re hearing ‘em…We passed a law back there in ’57 and 
said it was the first time in eighty-five years that everyone was going to have 
a chance to vote (…) And we’re going to say it again (…) in ’64.’16 
 
 
Showdown in Atlantic City 
 
Ignorant of the President’s machinations against them, the MFDP arrived 
confidently in Atlantic City. The reception of their Credentials Committee 
presentation on Saturday, August 22, encouraged their optimism. Joseph 
Rauh summarized their arguments: the MFDP’s loyalty to the national 
party’s slate, its meticulous following of party rules, and the Regulars’ 
denunciation of both. Several Mississippians testified of the harassment they 
had suffered in their quest for the vote. Fannie Lou Hamer’s testimony was 
so heart-wrenching that President Johnson ordered a press conference in its 
middle to get her off the air. T.V. networks, however, cunningly replayed 
her speech at prime time, after which 416 support telegrams arrived at the 
White House. Outsiders like Martin Luther King also played on the 
Committee members’ emotions, reminding them of ‘the moral health of this 
party and this nation.’ The MFDP’s moral plea proved highly effective, 
especially against the Regulars’ hollow rebuttal: they denied discrimination 
and asked not to seat this ‘group of dissatisfied, power-hungry soreheads.’ 
Consequently, ‘no human being confronted with the truth or our testimony 
could remain indifferent,’ one SNCC-worker reported, ‘Many tears fell.’ 
After Rauh spoke, The New Republic observed, ‘even the reporters rose and 
                                                     
16 WHS, WH Papers, Letters Harold Leventhal to David Lawrence, August 5, 1964, 
and to John Bailey and David Lawrence, August 17, 1964; Davis, ‘Sisters and Brothers 
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applauded.’ Credentials Committee chair David Lawrence then postponed a 




Fig. 2: Testimony Fannie Lou Hamer during the MFDP’s 
presentation before the Credentials Committee. (Source: 
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org) 
 
The MFDP clearly won this round. The Credentials Committee 
therefore offered it seats as ‘honored guests.’ The MFDP rejected this, so 
the Committee again postponed until Monday. The MFDP optimistically 
continued lobbying, but nonetheless discussed potential compromises. It 
approved of one that Oregon Congressman Edith Green proposed: the 
proportional seating of all in both Mississippi delegations who pledged 
alliance to the national party. This was sound pragmatic politics, indicating 
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that the MFDP was not naive. The MFDP actually expected the seating of 
both since this had been customary in the past, like the 1944 DNC which 
seated two competing Texas delegations. In one Lyndon Johnson himself 
had been a delegate.18   
Although the MFDP’s top strategists determined many of its 
moves, they always consulted its members. Moses mediated between them 
and national party representatives at high-level political meetings. This was 
necessary, Rauh explained, because even though ‘you couldn’t do better 
than [utilizing these Mississippi] people as their own advocates’ they ‘hadn’t 
been going around the country’ like Moses. But Moses insisted that the rest 
of the MFDP-delegates should be incorporated in such meetings because 
they could only reach consensus on a seating decision if all – as in their 
meetings at home – were equally privileged to information. He considered 
the convention ‘a huge classroom’ in which Mississippi blacks could ‘[learn] 
the democratic process.’ After all, ‘[t]hey were there[,] had nothing else to 
do, and they could all sit, while we all talked.’ Moses spent Sunday 
explaining the different compromises to them because most ‘couldn’t 
follow all the shifts in strategy.’ He even declined to leave an MFDP-rally 
where he would speak to attend a top-level meeting in King’s suite. Moses 
sent Hamer, Henry, and three other Mississippi blacks instead, who likewise 
insisted that any other interested MFDP-delegates could listen from the hall 
through an open door.19 
Many national black leaders, however, felt that politics was best left 
to the professional politicians, whereas Moses believed that despite the 
MFDP members’ lack of education they were perfectly capable of 
understanding ‘the relationship of the politics they were trying to challenge 
to the life they wanted to lead.’ Or, as one MFDP-delegate said, ‘we was 
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ignorant [but] not stupid.’ But Wilkins told MFDP-members that he had 
‘been in the business over twenty years [so] why don’t you pack up and go 
home?’ In a meeting that deliberately excluded the MFDP, the conservative 
black representatives of Northern delegations also told SNCC-workers they 
believed the MFDP should do what President Johnson wanted. One of 
them even tricked Moses into giving up a list of the Credential Committee 
members who supported the MFDP. Subsequently all received phone calls 
from presidential aides pressuring them to withdraw their support or they 
would lose benefits like loans or job offers.20  
The white liberal establishment viewed the MFDP similarly. 
Humphrey and Reuther privately characterized the MFDP as ‘emotionally 
[unstable]’, but were open to its ‘more reasonable’ middle-class 
representatives, like Henry. The Democratic machine’s ‘real resentment 
[was] not against the exclusion of Paul Johnson’s crowd’, Rauh accordingly 
concluded, but ‘against the inclusion of our crowd.’ This interpretation was 
reinforced on Monday when Humphrey convened with several Credentials 
Committee members, along with King, Moses, Henry, Hamer, and white 
Mississippi minister Ed King. In tears he explained his vice-presidency was 
at risk. Hamer, crying as well, shamed him by asking if his ‘position [was] 
more important…than four hundred thousand black people’s lives?’ She left 
in disgust, and was deliberately excluded from further meetings. Humphrey 
later admitted that the President had said he did not want ‘that illiterate 
woman’ speaking before the DNC. The Democratic politicos preferred 
dealing with the Harvard-educated Moses (Humphrey patronizingly 
believed that anything Moses told ‘those people they’re bound to do’) and 
Martin Luther King. Edith Green, who had also left angry, announced they 
still had enough support on the Credentials Committee to get a minority 
report asking for a roll call, although their number had now dropped 
considerably. David Lawrence then again postponed a decision until 
Tuesday.21  
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That day Humphrey met again with Henry, Moses, Martin Luther 
King, and Ed King. Also present were Bayard Rustin and Walter Reuther, 
whom President Johnson had asked to fly in to help stop the MFDP. 
Reuther compliantly threatened to fire Rauh and to cease his union’s 
financial support for Martin Luther King. Humphrey then outlined a new 
compromise to the MFDP-delegates: the DNC would seat Henry and Ed 
King as at-large delegates, the rest of the MFDP as ‘honored guests’ 
(without voting powers) and all Regulars who signed a loyalty oath. It also 
promised to end voter discrimination during the elections of future state 
delegations. Joined by Reuther and Rustin he insisted that the MFDP-
representatives accepted the compromise immediately, without consulting 
their colleagues. The tension in the room was palpable. When Humphrey 
incredibly impressed that ‘the peace of the world depends on you and what 
you do now’, Moses quietly retorted, ‘[W]e didn’t come here to represent 
the people of the world. We are here to represent the voteless people of 
Mississippi.’22  
The back-and-forth stopped when a senator aide came in, shouting 
‘It’s over!’ They rushed to the next room to watch a bulletin announcing 
that the Credentials Committee had unanimously accepted the compromise, 
while the people in Humphrey’s suite still thought it was up for negotiation. 
Moses angrily left the room, shouting ‘You tricked us!’ at Humphrey and 
slamming the door in his face. Moses was also furious at Rauh, because the 
Committee’s ‘unanimous’ acceptance implied that he had accepted too. He 
and the other MFDP-supporters in the Committee had actually voted ‘no,’ 
but Rauh still believed that fighting on was futile because their numbers had 
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now dropped beneath the necessary eleven and because he regarded the 
compromise ‘a great victory for civil rights.’23 
 The MFDP considered the compromise appalling. It was not even a 
real compromise but rather ‘a decision made and told to the delegation.’ 
Coupled with the administration’s trickery, the MFDP explained, this 
represented the ‘kind of dictation’ Mississippi blacks were ‘learning to stand 
up against.’ The compromise was paternalistic in other ways too. First, the 
two seats with the national party deciding who occupied them – two 
middle-class men – was ‘token recognition’ and ‘typical white man picking 
Black folks’ leaders.’ Second, the promise of future reform was empty, 
because it prohibited discrimination against ‘voters’, and Mississippi blacks 
still had little chance of becoming registered. When Moses asked Humphrey 
how many voters he could ‘guarantee us in Mississippi in the next four 
years,’ he simply replied, ‘We can’t guarantee you any because the 
Democratic Party doesn’t run the administration.’ Third, the two seats were 
at large, which meant that the MFDP would not represent Mississippi, but 
blacks nationwide. They were simply two extra seats that were created for 
this purpose, so the administration cunningly would not have to take them 
away from the Regulars. Fourth, the compromise did not offer the MFDP 
‘permanent recognition, patronage, official status or a guarantee of 
participation in the 1968 convention.’ Above all, MFDP-delegate Victoria 
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Gray explained, accepting meant ‘betraying the very many people back there 
in Mississippi [who had risked] their lives.’24 
 The mood at the nearby Union Baptist Church, where the MFDP 
delegation met to discuss the events, was bitter. It now realized, one 
volunteer noted, that ‘naked coercion, arm twisting, and sneaky backroom 
deals’ was ‘also the stuff democracy is made of.’ ‘Had we been more 
politically sophisticated,’ Henry agreed, ‘we could have seen that, on the 
national level, the party comes before issues.’ The MFDP angrily voted to 
accept nothing less than Green’s proposal. That evening it held a sit-in in 
the empty Mississippi section; all but four Regulars had refused the loyalty 
pledge and returned home. Yet because of the unit-rule, these four could 
still cast votes on behalf of all the Regulars. This essentially meant they had 
won: even in absence they kept their seats and their votes. Meanwhile the 
chair read out the compromise to all the state delegations; it passed within 
thirty seconds.25  
 On Wednesday Aaron Henry reconvened the MFDP to hear several 
national civil rights and political leaders including Rustin and Lowenstein. 
They all urged the MFDP to reconsider, insisting it did not understand the 
difference between ‘protest and politics.’ Even Martin Luther King, who 
admitted that he would have voted against it if he had been a native 
Mississippian, asserted that pragmatism should prevail ‘even in the most 
idealistic of situations.’ Fearing the delegation was overwhelmed by the 
presence of these ‘big shots’, Moses advised the group that their decision 
should be based on ‘Mississippi and its own hopes and desires’, not on 
‘[pleasing] the liberal civil rights establishment.’ The MFDP then reviewed 
the compromise in private. Most of its moderate middle-class members 
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argued in favor, but after Hamer, Gray, and others insisted they were 
betraying their constituents, they voted for rejection once more.26  
 
 
Victory or Defeat? 
 
‘In the short [run]’, SNCC-worker Ivanhoe Donaldson concluded, the 
Challenge ‘was a bitter defeat.’ It painfully revealed the class-bias among 
national civil rights leaders and white liberals, leading to the break of large 
segments of civil rights workers away from both. ‘Atlantic City was a 
watershed,’ Moses asserted, ‘[T]he idea had been that you were working 
more or less with the support of the Democratic Party [but now you] turned 
around and your support was puddle-deep.’ Consequently, the Party ‘lost a 
whole generation of its [bottom-up] activists.’ First it fueled the movement’s 
transition to Black Power. ‘Anyone who trusted the white man at this 
point’, SNCC-chairman John Lewis wrote, ‘was a fool, a[n Uncle] Tom.’ 
SNCC’s embrace of Black Power in turn alienated it further from the liberal 
establishment and from the poor blacks, many of whom stayed true to the 
Democratic Party, whom it had helped organize, like Hamer. Other 
workers, like Moses, simply dropped out of the movement altogether. 
Second, many of the white Freedom Summer volunteers, reunited in the 
anti-Vietnam War Movement, were disillusioned too. Atlantic City, Lewis 
summarized, turned them ‘into radicals and revolutionaries. It fuelled the 
very forces of protest (…) that would eventually drive Lyndon Johnson out 
of office.’27  
Yet in all social revolutions there are periods which are experienced 
as setbacks but with hindsight are seen as advanced. A similar argument 
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could be made for the MFDP because ‘in the long run’, Donaldson 
admitted, ‘from a franchise point-of-view (…) the party won.’ In the North, 
Moses recalled, ‘It was the [bottom-up] political movement that grew out of 
the MFDP that began to speak to [inner-city blacks and got them] to run’ 
for office and vote on election days. Furthermore, the Democratic Party 
kept its promise to end its internal racism: delegations now have to consist 
of minority and white delegates according to their states’ racial composition 
and pledge Party loyalty. At the 1968 DNC the Regulars were ousted. ‘The 
fact that there will never again be all-white delegations’, Guyot proudly 
concluded, ‘is attributed to what we did in 1964.’ It also expanded its 
outreach to other minorities like Hispanics and to women.28  
The Challenge additionally spurred the acceptance of Southern 
blacks into the political process and the Democratic Party’s ranks. The 
MFDP had strengthened President Johnson’s commitment to ending black 
disfranchisement and immediately after his reelection in November, he 
ordered the Justice Department to draft appropriate legislation. The 
subsequent Voting Rights Act of 1965, which ruled discriminatory voting 
practices unconstitutional, ensured that by 1968 almost 60% of Mississippi’s 
eligible blacks were registered. Consequently, the number of black elected 
officials grew from 1,469 nationwide in 1968 to 9,040 in 2000. 1,628 of 
them lived in Mississippi and Alabama. The MFDP’s continued activism 
also helped force its adoption. Unlike most national civil rights activists, the 
MFDP left the DNC proudly. After all, one COFO-worker observed, ‘They 
had the President of the United States stop for them.’ They kept building 
their party as a grassroots instrument for long-term social change. In some 
counties the MFDP still existed in 1979. In 1965 it organized another 
national enterprise, the Congressional Challenge, which demonstrated 
through hundreds of depositions from locals that the state’s Congressmen 
were elected illegitimately. While the bloody civil rights marches in Selma 
helped the administration persuade the public at large to support the Act, 
behind-the-scenes the MFDP had made the opening salvo. Politicians, Ed 
King explained in 2010, do not ‘pass a new law because people are in the 
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streets… they need [to be able to] say ‘we did this with reason, with calm. 
We had thousands of documents.’’29  
Consequently, Joseph Rauh was right when he proclaimed that ‘the 
Democratic Party was remade’ in August 1964: all this ultimately opened 
the way for Barack Obama’s nomination as the Party’s presidential 
candidate and the expanded black electorate that helped him become the 





The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s Challenge provides historians 
with a better understanding of the production of social change as a top-
down or bottom-up process. The MFDP was both: its efforts on the 
national level complimented grassroots initiatives in Mississippi and vice 
versa. Its influential Northern allies pressured the administration into taking 
the challenge seriously, and lawyers like Rauh devised needed strategies. The 
COFO-workers, aided by the white Northern volunteers, facilitated the 
successful execution of MFDP meetings. Simultaneously its success 
depended on grassroots leadership in showing the Regulars’ intent at 
exclusion and in building the MFDP at the base. Or, as Moses argued, ‘No 
matter how great Martin Luther King was, he could not go and challenge 
[the Regulars] (…) the only people who could do that were the people from 
Mississippi.’ Ultimately, ‘it was when sharecroppers, day laborers, and 
domestic workers found their voice (…) that the Mississippi political game 
was really over.’31 
 Although the extent of the social change the MFDP set in motion 
did not become visible until years later, the MFDP succeeded in its goals. 
The Democratic Party’s extensive resort to trickery to stop it testifies to its 
power. It penetrated the conscience of the nation’s leading politicians, even 
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as they dictated the time line in which social change would be 
institutionalized. The MFDP, however, stayed true to its grassroots core. It 
refused to let ‘big shot’ political, labor, and civil rights leaders (or their 
money) decide its future in backrooms. Instead it ensured that all its 
members, including the poor and uneducated, were privy to the same 
information and made decisions on consensus. Because it simultaneously 
worked well inside and outside the established system, the MFDP managed, 
against all odds, to accomplish a historic feat of which the effects still 
resonate, including in the man who occupies Lyndon Johnson’s seat today.  
 
 
 
